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CULPABLE HOMICIDES IN RESISTING ARREST*
JOHN SLOA.N DicK yt
The purpose of this article is to state the principles involved in
determining whether a defendant who has killed in resisting arrest is
guilty of manslaughter or murder. The scope of consideration will
extend only to situations where the resistance was improper. If the
resistance is alleged to have been proper, a question of self-defense is
presented; and while, in fact, this plea is commonly made in the same
cases considered here, yet very different principles and rules of law are
concerned.'
This particular question, although important in the substantive
criminal law, has received little analytical attention from either
treatises or decisions. The customary treatment of it is a broad
statement that: a killing in resisting legal arrest will be murder, but if
the arrest or attempted arrest is illegal, it will be at most only man-
slaughter.2 In an effort to evaluate such rules, and to determine their
availability to meet present day needs of the administration of
criminal justice, an examination will be made of their application to
particular situations. This inquiry will deal both with legal and
with illegal arrests. Under legal arrests, it will consider two prob-
lems. First, if the killing is otherwise murder, will hot blood oc-
casioned by a legal arrest reduce it to manslaughter? Second, if the
killing is otherwise manslaughter, will the fact that it was in re-
sistance to a legal arrest raise it to murder? Under illegal arrests will
be discussed four views as to when an illegal arrest will reduce a
killing from murder to manslaughter.
*This article was written for Professor Sam B. Warner's graduate course in
Administration of Criminal Justice given at the Harvard Law School.
tMember of the Massachusetts bar.
'For this separate problem on right of self-defense and justified killing, see
article by C. Percy Wilcox, (1895) 34 AM. L. REG. 395 (N. s.), in which it is said at
p. 400: "To sum the whole matter up, if the person illegally restrained of his
liberty uses no more force than is necessary to obtain his freedom, and only
shoots as a last resort, he will not be held accountable before the law."
2RUSSELL, CRIMES AND MISDEMEANORS (8th ed. 1923) 681, 695; KERR, HOMI-
CIDE (1891 ed.) §§ 98, 150; 2 BIsHOP, NEW CRIMINAL LAW (8th ed. 1892) § 652
WHARTON, HoMIcIDE (2nd ed. 1875) §§ 225, 228; 1 WHARTON, CRIMINAL LA :
(9th ed. 1885) § 413; GRIGSBY, CRIMINAL LAW (1922) §§ 549, 550, 551. See also:
W. W. Thornton, "Homicide Committed in Maldng an Arrest", 13 CRIm. LAW
MAG. (1891) 175-203,343-350.
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A. LEGALAaRESTS
A z. If the Killing is Otherwise Murder Will Hot Blood Occasioned by a
Legal Arrest Reduce it to Manslaughter?
If the arrest is legal, must the homicide caused by resistance be
murder? The decisions and statutes generally state that murder is a
killing with malice. And here, as elsewhere in the law, the meaning of
malice has not been limited by a homogeneous definition. An intent
to kill has been the basic concept of "malice aforethought". To this,
other situations have been added where there is said to be implied
malice, such as a killing with intent to inflict serious bodily harm, a
killing in the course of a felony, or a killing by means of a dangerous
weapon. Where there is an intentional killing in resistance to an
arrest known to be legal, all courts agree it is murder, for the law can-
not afford to recognize a mitigating provocation based upon a lawful
arrest, unless it is to be placed in the position of devouring itself. If
the agent of the law is to be encouraged in his duty to arrest the de-
fendant, the law cannot at the same time give indulgence to him who
willfully chooses to be unlawful to the extent of deadly resistance.
Anger with the law is an unworthy passion.
This refusal to recognize any adequate provocation in the case of an
arrest known to be legal where the resistance was with intent to kill,
is extended also to the situation of killing with so-called implied
malice, and to those situations where it is not shown what the de-
fendant believed as to the legality of the arrest. In the words of one
court.0
"Elliott then, possessing the right to make the arrest, it at
once became defendant's duty to submit. Where such duty
exists, hot blood can not be engendered by making or attempt-
ing a lawful arrest .......
The duty spoken of by the court is significantly measured by the
legality of the arrest. That the defendant mistakenly believes he has
no such duty will not avail him. In the instant case the defendant
knew only that officers were attempting to arrest him. The state of
mind of the resisting party is irrelevant and neither mistake of law4
nor of fact as to the legality of his arrest has been recognized as a
mitigating circumstance.
The mistake of fact situation is not expressly treated, as such, in
3Statev. Albright, i44 Mo. 638,653,46 S. W. 62o,624 (I898).
'Simpson v. State, 56 Ark. 8, 19 S. W. 99 (1892). Convict out of penitentiary
on a pass from warden, kills, erroneously believing the officer-had no right to
arrest.
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any discovered case. It might be argued that a provocation plea is
recognized in the cases5 which reduce murder to manslaughter when
the killer did not know or have reasonable grounds to know the
character in which the agent, legally authorized in fact, was assuming
to act. However, these are more properly treated as cases of illegal
arrest because the officer fails in performing his duty to make his
character known if it would not otherwise have been apparent to de-
fendant.6 This theory has been articulated in a Texas opinion:7
"In passing upon the question raised as to whether appellant
was resisting a legal arrest, his knowledge of the fact that the
deceased was an officer was an element."
If so handled, it is proper to allow a manslaughter provocation where
the defendant killed in a passion aroused by the assault.
The reason why the law considers only whether the arrest was in
fact legal, is not deeply buried. However, the answer to the question
of why an indulgence based on provocation should be denied when
the defendant makes an honest and reasonable mistake of fact as
to the legality of the arrest and bases his resistance on that mistake,
must be founded on something more substantial than the flimsy
presumption that every man knows the law. Righteous indignation
created by a supposed assault may arouse a passion in the killer quite
as great as that likely to be aroused by an arrest which is in fact
illegal. The defendant then kills from the same frailty of human
nature which is ordinarily given indulgence by the law. The policy of
the law which favors a strong deterrent against deadly resistance to
lawful process, opposes the extension of the reasonable man standard
to this situation. Thus the basic reason underlying the strict murder
rule results from placing the focus on the officer exercising his ditty
'Croom v. State, 85 Ga. 718, 725, 11 S. E. 1035, 1037 (189o). The court, re-
versing a murder conviction, said: "This [lower court charge] made it necessary
in order for the homicide to be graded as manslaughter, for the officer to be
found in the wrong, ignoring the fact that he might be in the right and the ac-
cused not know it." If the court has spoken precisely, it means that mistake of
fact made a difference. Williford v. State, 121 Ga. 173, 48 S. E. 962 (1904),
refers to Croom case as a question of illegal arrest. Also: State v. Spaulding, 34
Minn. 361, 25 N.W. 793 (1885); Cornett v. Comm., 198 Ky. 236, 248 S.W. 54o
(1923); Love v. State, 15 Okia. Cr. 429, 177 Pac. 387 (1919); Roberts v. State, 14
Mo. 138, 55 Am. Dec. 97 (1851); Tomson's Case, J. Kelyng 66, 84 Eng. Rep.
1o85 (1666); L. R. A. I918 D. at p. 975.
6This doubt will be resolved when some court decides the case of an officer
reasonably notifying a defendant who, unknown to the officer, is blind and /or
deaf. The defendant kills out of a passion aroused by the reasonably supposed
assault, with no question of self-defense raised.
7Burkhardt v. State, 83 Tex. Cr. R. 228, 232, 202 S. W. 513, 515 (1918).
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rather than on the resisting party. The usual provocation plea,
based on a recognition of the frailties of human nature where there is
not a "bad heart", must yield to the need for encouraging the per-
formance of official duty, and for restraining the exercise of limited
prerogatives given to such frailties where these may conflict in such
direct fashion with legal process.
A 2. If the Killing is Otherwise Manslaughter, Will the Fact that it
was in Resistance to a Legal Arrest Raise it to Murder?
So far, consideration has been directed only to those homicides
which would be murder regardless of the fact that the defendant
killed while resisting arrest. The only question has been whether
mitigating circumstances should not be deemed adequate provo-
cation despite the legality of arrest. A more challenging inquiry
seems justified. If the rule-that a homicide in resistance to lawful
arrest is murder-means anything, it should be supported by cases
the facts of which include neither an intent to kill nor any of the
recognized implied malice situations, i. e. use of dangerous weapon
and so forth. The writer has not found such a case. Should further
search reveal any, this much may be said now, decisions will be
lacking in both sufficient numbers and quality to justify the finality
with which the so-called rule is apparently accepted today.
The great majority of courts and writers, never having expressly
considered the question, assume--and on eminent authority-that
resistance to lawful arrest, per se, creates the requisite implied malice.
Lord Hale stated the rule,8 but cited no cases to support it; Black-
stone adopted Hale's statement as law, and today practically every
court that passes on a case of killing in resistance to a lawful arrest
pays homage to this rule by adding another approving dictum.9
This development is well illustrated by a Kentucky opinion which
has been relied on in subsequent cases as establishing the rule for
83 HALE, PLEAS OF THE CROWN (1694) 457. "The second kind of malice im-
plied is, when a minister of justice, as a bailiff, constable, or watchman, etc., is
killed in the execution of his office, in such a case it is murder." FOSTER, CROWN
LAW (2nd ed. 179I) 270.
94 BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES 201 states: "...if one kills an officer of justice
... in the execution of his duty.. .knowing his authority or the intention with
which he interposes, the law will imply malice, and the killer shall be guilty of
murder." See Reg. v. Lockley, 4 Fost. and F. 155, 158 (1864)--officer hit on
head by a brick, illegal arrest question, manslaughter verdict; Pew's Case, King's
Bench, Cro. Cas. 183, 79 Eng. Rep. 760 (i63o), Sayre's Cases 783--stabbing with
a sword; Donehy and Prather v. Comm., 170 Ky. 474, 479, 186 S. W. x6i, 163
(i916)--officer shot to death. For statement of rule in standard texts, see supra
note 2 and CLARK & MARSHALL, CRIMES (3rd ed. 1927) 301 § 249.
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that state. The defendant in resisting lawful arrest killed the officer
with a "deadly bowie knife." The court in affirming a murder con-
viction said:10
"The law did not require that they should have been told the
killing must have been malicious. The officer is the minister
of the law... his person is therefore clothed with a peculiar
sanctity. An assault upon him, when properly engaged in the
execution of his duty, is an assault upon the law, and if he be
stricken down at such time .... by one knowing him to be an
officer, it is murder, although the doer may not have any par-
ticular malice. (4 Blackstone, page 201; 1 East, page 303.)"
The establishment of a new implied malice situation is certainly not
required for the decision in such cases.
On the other hand, there are at least two cases which have held
that the death of the arresting party will not necessarily be murder
even though the death was caused by the defendant's resistance or
efforts to escape. In 1873, the case of Regina v. Porter presented facts
which would actually put the stated rule to test." The defendant
was indicted for the murder of a private person who died as the result
of injuries received while assisting to make a lawful arrest at an
officer's command. In the course of the tussle, the deceased received
a kick from the defendant which proved fatal. The law of the case is
based on the charge given to the jury at nisi prius by Brett, J. As
reported, inter alia:
"He directed them distinctly that if the prisoner kicked the
man, intending to inflict grievous harm, and death ensued from
it, he was guilty of murder. He directed them further that if
the prisoner inflicted the kick in resistan~e of his lawful arrest,
even although he did not intend to inflict grievous injury, he was
equally guilty of murder. But if, in the course of the struggle,
he kicked the man, not intending to kick him, then he was only
guilty of manslaughter. ... If, however, they thought that the
kick was accidental, in the course of a wild struggle, then he
would be guilty only of manslaughter."
The jury returned a verdict of manslaughter. It is obvious that
Brett, J., went to some length to make possible the manslaughter
verdict. For that reason all that he says may not be analytically
consistent. It is patent that here was a case which called for a
murder conviction if the rule stated without equivocation by the dicta
following Hale and Blackstone was to be applied and given meaning.
If the rule ever existed and if it continued to have meaning after
1
°Dilger v. Comm., 88 Ky. 550, 561 (x889).
'112 Cox Criminal Cases 444, 445, 446 (x873).
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Regina v. Porter, it was doomed to be further disregarded in 1919
when an equally difficult set of facts was presented for decision to the
supreme court of West Virginia. The defendant was driving an
automobile near the state boundary when an officer jumped on his car
to make a lawful arrest. In attempting to get across the state bound-
ary and thus escape arrest, as he thought, the defendant inadvertently
killed the arresting officer by crashing into a bridge. The court
squarely faced the problem and relying heavily on Regina v. Porter
reversed the murder conviction.' 3
"Unless the jury believed defendant intentionally collided
with the bridge, malice, an essential element of murder, is
wanting, it cannot be inferred from the mere effort to escape
arrest."
In view of the fact that these decisions constitute the only judicial
expression on the pre~ise problem, it is not unlikely that they will
influence future decisions and legislative action away from the logical
consequences of the supposed common law rule. There is no doubt
that they cross a strong and well established current of authority, but
there does seem to be appreciable merit in their course. The indi-
vidual will still be punished for his wrongful act and those who per-
form official duties will thus receive a measure of deterrent pro-
tection. Why should the deterrent protection in the form of punish-
ment be necessarily a maximum penalty of murder, where the effect
of resistance or attempt to escape is not likely to be death, and where,
in all probability, society is not dealing with such an individual as the
"gun-toter"-a real menace to the official?14 If such views are ac-
cepted, it follows that the rule (fixing homicide in resistance to lawful
arrest as murder) means only that a mitigating provocation- cannot
be set up to reduce to manslaughter a killing which would have been
murder regardless of the fact that the defendant was resisting legal
22State v. Weisengoff, 85 W. Va. 271, 101 S. E. 450 (1919).
n3lbid. 285, 286. These cases have not been disniissed as erroneous and without
merit by able commentators. See WHARTON, HOMICIDE (2nd ed. 1875) 199 § 228
where Regina v. Porter is cited in support of an italicized rule that: "Where intent
was not to kill or inflict serious bodily harm the offense is but manslaughter,
though the arrest was legal." See also 2 BRILL, CYCLOPEDIA OF CRIIINAL LAW
(1923) 1124 § 671.
* 
14A though on no more scientific data than the reading of the bulk of the re-
sistance to arrest cases which resulted in homicides and from several years' study
of a state prison population, the writer feels strongly that such decisions most
satisfactorily fit the punishment to the crime, and, with the better individual-
ization tenets of modem criminology, the punishment to the individual. At the
same time it is felt there is sufficient protective deterrence in a manslaughter con-
viction to satisfy the policy of the law.
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arrest. And in truth, this is all the rule has meant as invoked in the
vast majority of such homicide cases. Weight is added to these views
by the circumstance that in a.recent case the plea of misadvertent
shooting during resistance was met by resting the murder conviction
on a statute making such resistance a felony, 5 thus placing the
murder conviction on another well recognized homicide rule. No
case has been discovered in which the court held that the malice
requisite for murder could be implied from the bare resistance to
arrest, although this assumption has been of long standing.
B. ILLEGAL ARsRsS
Is killing in resistance to illegal arrest murder or manslaughter?
The homicide cases arising from resistance to unlawful arrest have as
a whole been even more bluntly handled than those where the arrest
was legal. The cases here considered fall into four groups: first, those
which base their decision solely on the illegality of the arrest-if the
arrest is illegal the degree of homicide can be no greater than man-
slaughter unless "express malice" is proven; second, those depending
upon a presumption that the killing was caused by the passion pro-
voked by the illegality of the arrest; third, a group of authorities
which require the defendant to show that he in fact subjectively
acted from the provocation of hot blood aroused by the illegality of
the arrest; and fourth, a few cases denying altogether the sufficiency
of the provocation of hot blood aroused by illegal arrest to reduce
murder to manslaughter. The common problem of all these cases is
what proof, if any, other than the unlawfulness of the arrest is neces-
sary to reduce the killing to manslaughter.
B x. View that Illegality of Arrest Always Reduces Murder to Man-
slaughter Unless There is Express Malice
Taking up the first group, the reasoning upon which the so-called
mandatory manslaughter cases rest is not to be found in the opinions.
The test is the legality of the arrest. Once the illegality of the arrest
IsPeoplev. Arnett, 239 Mich. 123, 135, 214 N. W. 231, 235 (1927). Court said:
"The law exacts duties of police officers and protects them in the performance
thereof by rendering it a felony to resist or obstruct lawful arrest [3 Comp. Laws
1915, § '4994], and constitutes it murder to kill, either intentionally or even per
mischance, such officer in resisting or obstructing a lawful arrest. [Defendant]
did not excuse himself at all in claiming that, when the sheriff told him he must
come with him, he thought of the revolver in his pocket, and, fearful it would be
found on his person, took it in his hand to cast it in the back of the automobile,
and, . . .the sheriff seized hold of it and it was discharged." For a further treat-
ment of statutory provision see infra p. 38 8.
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is established, the killing can be no greater than manslaughter.16
Clearly these cases do not "concern themselves with the mental con-
dition of the killer; rather they continue to focus on the arresting
official. Just as he must be vindicated and protected if acting law-
fully; so in a vague way, he is punished and a deterrent against un-
lawful arrest is provided in an equally vague way by not making the
taking of his life a supreme offense. The weight of English authority
is committed to this view,17 and the literalness with which able courts
in this country have applied the general rule is shockingly illustrated
in a Massachusetts case.18 The defendant was indicted for the
murder of a constable who had arrested him as he was leaving a rail-
road station into which he had previously broken. The court treated
the offense as one not committed in the presence of the officer, and
since breaking and entering was not a felony in Massachusetts at
that date, the arrest was illegal. The defendant escaped, and when
pursued, drew a gun ordering the constable to "stop and go back", or
be shot. The constable stopped, but on refusing to go back was shot
dead. Shaw, C. J., sitting with Fletcher and Bigelow, J. J., directed
the jury that there being no felony and no warrant and no reasonable
suspicion of felony, the arrest was illegal and defendant could be con-
victed of only manslaughter, which verdict was accordingly re-
turned. And such a result is not unknown today.19
162 ARCHBOLD, CRIMINAL PRACTICE AND PLEADING 242, relied on in Rafferty v.
State, 69 III. 11 (1873). The Court reversed a murder conviction, but when the
case came up again, 72 Ill. 37, after a retrial, the court sustained the murder
conviction based on an express malice finding. See cases (I9O5)66 L. R. A. 353;
(1911) 33 L. R. A. (n. s.) 143.
1"Ferrer's Case, Cro. Car. 371 (1634); Pew's Case, supra note 9; Rex v. Patience,
7 Car. and P. 775 (1837); Rex v. Thompson, I Moody C. C. 8o, i68 Eng. Rep.
1193 (1825); R. v. Tooley, 2 Ld. Raym. 1296, Ix Mod. Rep. 242, (17o9) where the
majority upholding a manslaughter conviction said in reply to dissent: "They say,
likewise, that in the case at bar, it could not be a provocation, because they knew
not that she was illegally arrested, but surely ignorantia facti will excuse, but
never condemn a man. Indeed he acts at his peril in such a case, but he must not
lose his life for his ignorance, when he happens to be in the right." The sig-
nificant thing about the English cases on this subject is that they are compara-
tivelydeminimis. Cf. Mackalley's Case, Co. 9 Report 6i (x6Ii).
'sComm. v. Carey, 66 Mass. (12 Cush.) 246 (1853). This case is probably law
in Massachusetts today; see Comm. v. Phelps, 209 Mass. 396, 4o6, 95 N. R.
868, 872 (1911).
19Peoplev. White, 333 Ill. 512, 519, I65 N. E. 168, 171 (1929). Defendant was
convicted of murder for shooting a police officer who questioned him about regis-
tration of car and on finding a discrepancy told defendant to come to station with
him in order to check it up. Defendant shortly began shooting with a gun inside
his pocket and in the affray the officer and defendant's companion, a recently
escaped convict, were killed. Court reversed conviction and held that there being
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Most of the jurisdictions adopting this view have recognized an
exception where the killing is done with "express malice". Even
though the arrest were illegal, if the defendant killed with express
malice he would be guilty of murder. 0 In the words of an Oregon
opinion:s'
"We do not think that the court had a right as a matter of law
to assume that the arrest had the effect of exciting.., passion,....
there was some evidence which the jury had a right to consider
which tended to show malice."
To this extent these courts adopted a subjective standard and looked
to the motive of the defendant in deciding the degree of homicide.
This so-called exception is finding increased favor in the cases and yet
it is submitted that, if not utterly misconceived, it is at best a gauche
process for reaching a proper result. Technically speaking, there is no
need to establish further malice, because the intent to kill or to inflict
serious injury under well accepted doctrines satisfies that requisite,
and if one of these or of similar conditions is not present in a situation
of illegal arrest, the homicide is clearly only manslaughter. By very
definition, the "express malice exception" is only an exception when
it operates to prevent the illegality of the arrest from reducing to
manslaughter what would otherwise be murder. It is highly un-
fortunate that the same word used in a cotmmon situation should be
given a wholly different meaning from the accepted technical one by
the addition of a redundant adjective. In spite of an unhappy
term, the fact remains that the view that a killing in resistance to an
illegal arrest is at most manslaughter is now limited by whatever
content the court chooses to pour into "express malice", and the
courts have differed on the evidence necessary to constitute such
malice. Without exception, however, in all the express malice cases
the arrested party has made it clear by his deliberate resistance that
he was not acting from a passion provoked by the illegality of the
arrest. Most of the decisions to date which rest on the express malice
exception go further and require a showing of personal hatred on
the part of the defendant towards the deceased. For example, the
no reasonable grounds for suspicion the arrest was illegal "... . and it was re-
versible error, under the evidence, to give instructions as to the law of murder, as
there was no evidence in the record showing or tending to show previous or express
malice." See also People v. Scalisi, 324 Ill. 131, 154 N. E. 715 (1926).
20Rafferty v. People, 72 Ill. 37 (1837); Galvin v. State, 46 Tenn. (6 Cold.) 283
(1869); Roberson v. State, 43 Fla. 156, 29 So. 535 (19Ol); State v. Scheele, 57
Conn. 307 (1889); Reg. v. Sattler, Dearsly and Bell 539, 169 Eng. Rep. IiS
(1858).
21Statev. Meyers, 57 Ore. 50, 56, Iso Pac. 407,410 (1910).
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Massachusetts Supreme Court has approved the following charge as
an accurate statement of the law.:2
"Express malice means an actual state of mind existing in the
heart of the defendant towards the deputy sheriff of ill will, or
hatred, or dislike, or kindred feelings...
Lord Campbell, C. J., in giving the opinion of the English judges in a
crown case reserved expressed the same thought :u
"...the jury finding that he committed the crime out of
revenge and not with a view of escaping from the custody....
as he did not commit the offence with a view to his liberation,
it is immaterial whether he was in lawful custody or not-he
was guilty of murder."
This increased recognition and application of the so-called exception
is probably a desirable development. For it is unlikely, with opinions
showing greater awareness on the part of courts of the true nature of a
defendant's provocation to killing in resistance of illegal arrest as
ground for indulgence, that this exception will be so confined to the
rare situation where the homicide is the result of personal animos-
ity.24
B 2. View that Illegality of the Arrest is Presumed to Arouse Hot
Blood and so Reduce a Killing from Murder to Manslaughter
The second group of illegal arrest cases-those which reach a man-
slaughter decision for a homicide caused by resistance on the pre-
sumption that defendant killed out of passion-explicitly recognize
the character of the mitigating factor of provocation as a basis for
such indulgence.2
nComm. v. Phelps, supra note 18, 4o6, 407, 411, 95 N. E. at 872. The report
gives the full charge on the express malice point and the portion of the charge
apparently stating the objective standard of the provocation test.
2DReg. v. Sattler, supra note 20. - The answer to the question submitted,"...
supposing the custody not to have been lawful..." was: "We are all unhesitating-
ly of opinion that the killing under such circumstances was not necessarily only
manslaughter."
21See Roberson v. State, supra note 2o. The only pertinent evidence was of an
attempted illegal arrest and court said ". . .the fact that he did not know when
he shot whether his arrest was lawful or unlawful..." was a circumstance from
which the jury might find malice or premeditated design. See also Brooks and
Orme v. Comm., 61 Pa. 352, 357 (1869).
nBriggs v. Comm. 82 Va. 554, 565 (I886). See also Rex v. Chapman, Sussex
- Assizes, 12 Cox C.C. 4 (1871), Sayre's Cases 797. Hannen, J., directed jury:
"That it is presumed he acted, not with malice, but from the excitement of the
moment."
382,
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"The true view of the law, in reason, is that when the mere
fact of an illegal arrest... appears, if the one suffering it kills the
officer or other arresting person, whether with a deadly weapon
or by other means, he may rely on the presumption that his
mind was beclouded by passion; but if actual malice is affirm-
atively proved, the homicide will be murder."
Yet no case has been found where this presumption was rebutted
without lip service to the exception as to express or actual malice.
If the presumption cannot be affected by evidence that the defendant
resisted regardless of the legality of the arrest and did not kill from a
proper passion, the net result is only another version of the view that
killing in resisting an illegal arrest is only manslaughter. These
opinions do have separate significance, however. If the scope of the
express malice exception should be extended to make possible more
murder convictions, it is probable that it will be brought about by
diluting the strength of the present presumption that defendant
necessarily killed out of righteous passion. The point will be reached
where it can be shown in rebuttal either that defendant did not know
of the illegality of the arrest, or that he did not kill because such
illegality provoked him.
This line of development seems most likely for two reasons. The
cases which talk of presumptions, are necessarily aware of the provo-
cation basis which they presume. They will therefore be most amen-
able to the reasons for the extension. Also, since these courts have
given so much indulgence before, it is unlikely they will make a com-
plete change and put the burden of proving his provocation on the de-
fendant. Rather, it seems reasonable to expect that evolution toward
a stricter standard will come by way of putting the burden on the
state to produce evidence which may overcome the presumption
that the homicide was caused by adequate provocation. The flavor
of penalizing illegal arrests will thus be ietained, although more
properly measured.
A concrete illustration is available. In the Virginia case quoted
above, the defendant, a youth connected with an agricultural fair, was
illegally arrested on the street by the deceased, a county officer. The
defendant resisted and called for the officer's badge, denying his right
to make the arrest. The defendant "pulled loose from the deceased,
and shot him in the back of the head, and ran rapidly away, ..
The court affirmed a murder conviction, saying: 8
"I see nothing to suggest reason beclouded by passion; the
shooting appears to have been done coolly and deliberately,
and immediately flight followed.
2 Briggs v. Comm., supra note 25, 564, 566.
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"It is a case in which the jury was justified in finding malice;
they have ascertained the degree of the crime, and the same was
neither against the evidence nor without the evidence, .. "
The decision is a striling demonstration of what to expect when the
skids are greased with a mixture of presumptions and express malice
exceptions.
Whatever the original justification for the two views already con-
sidered, no reasons exist for their continuance. For normally today,
false arrest no longer carries with it the danger of prolonged im-
prisonment and physical suffering it did up to the seventeenth cen-
tury.27
B 3. View That to Reduce a Killing from Murder to Manslaughter the
Defendant's Hot Blood Must in Fact be Aroused by the Illegality of
the Arrest
There now remains for discussion the third group of illegal arrest
cases. In 1869, Agnew J., speaking for the Supreme Court of Penn-
sylvania in Brooks and Orme v. Comm., said :28
"But if the arrest were illegal it does not follow that the crime
was necessarily manslaughter. There remained still the question
on the evidence whether the killing was without malice, and
arose solely from a sudden heat and passion upon the illegal
arrest. ... The indulgence which the law shows in cases of man-
slaughter is to the weakness of human nature, not its wickedness."
As a result of this dictum-the arrest was in fact legal-the case has
become the leading one in the establishment of a subjective standard
by which the manslaughter indulgence is to be measured. Today
commentators, 9 courts,30 and legislatures3' are slowly taking cogniz-
27The trails of criminal justice problems cross frequently, and here it may well
be that abolition of severe 3rd degree and other unconscionable practices by some
police officials would make the man with a "record" less fearful of arrest and its
attendant incidents. 286I Pa. 352, 357, Ioo Am. Dec. 645, Sayre's Cases 799.
292 BIsHoP, NEW CIMINAL LAW (8th ed. 1892) §§ 652, 699. After stating the
broad rule that a homicide in resisting illegal arrest will be manslaughter, he con-
tinued: "Yet,-in reason, if in fact the outrage of this attempted illegal arrest has
not excited the passions, a killing in cold blood with a deadly weapon will be
murder. Perhaps this is not so plain in authority; for the books lay down the
doctrine in the very broad terms that a homicide in resisting an unlawful arrest is
manslaughter and not murder, even though committed by the use of a deadly
weapon,-a proposition possibly admitting some qualification on the author-
ities."
*°Territory v. Lynch, x8 N. M. i5, 133 Pac. 4o5 (1923); Williams v. Comm.,
128 Va. 698, 1O4 S. E. 853 (1920); Sanders v. State, 181 Ala. 35, 61 So. 336 (1913);
Miller v. State, 31 Tex. Crim. R. 6o9, 21 S. W. 925 (1893); Galvin v. State, 46
Tenn. (6 Cold.) 283 (1869).
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ance of the nature of the defendant's provocation to kill in the course
of illegal arrest. In Williams v. Comm., the Supreme Court of Virginia
affirmed a murder conviction squarely on the ground that the de-
fendant's passion could have been aroused only by the arrest not by
the possible illegality unknown to him. The court said.*2
"The question [legality of arrest] is an open one in Virginia
and it is unnecessary for us in this case to decide it, for the
reason that it clearly appears from the testimony of the accused
that no lack of authority of the officers who attempted to arrest
him influenced his conduct in any way .... it was nothing more
and in truth appeared nothing more to him than an orderly
arrest supposed by him to be lawful..."
Thus these authorities continue to recognize an illegal arrest as
adequate provocation for a mitigating passion, but they require the
jury to find as a fact that the homicide was the result of passion so
provoked. Assuming such a provocation to be deemed adequate in
law-which is not beyond argument-the subjective test seems with-
out doubt the proper approach.33
Otherwise the law, with no compensating policy, is put in the
position of appearing to condone--as it often actually does-one who
considers being arrested so unhealthy for him that the most effective
and irretrievable resistance is preferable. Moreover, the idea that
illegal arrests may be abated by automatically reducing the penalty
for killings committed in such situations, is absurd. There is a com-
plete answer. If it is more profitable for the criminal to shoot first
and inquire as to thelegality of the arrestwhen, as and if tried; equally
so is it safer for the officer to become nimble on the "draw", and to
shoot in self-defense, first.3 The vicious circle is then complete.
2128 Va. 698, 715, 719 (1920).
nFor the most satisfactory discussions see: State v. Middleton, 26 N. M. 353,
192 Pac. 483 (1920); Ex parle Sherwood, 29 Tex. Crim. App. 334, 15 S. W. 812
(389o); Cortez v. State, 44 Tex. Crim. Rep. 169, 69 S. W. 536 (I902)-which last
case is cited in (1905) 66 L. R. A. 374, note, as "overruling in effect Ex parte
Sherwood", but in this writer's opinion the decision gives express approbation to
the subjective test rule of Ex parte Sherwood and merely states that knowledge of
illegality is not material where only such force is used "as is reasonably necessary
to prevent the arrest .... But if such person.. .uses more force than is reasonably
necessary, he would be guilty at the least of manslaughter." The rule in Texas is
somewhat in doubt as a result of the decision in Earles v. State, 47 Tex. Cr. 559,
566, 85 S. W. I, 4 (19o5), but the remarks of Brooks, J., writing the opinion in the
same case on appeal from a new trial seem well taken, to the effect that the pre-
vious decisions establish the subjective standard in Texas. 52 Tex. Cr. 140, 348,
lO6 S. W. 139, 141 (1907). These remarks of Brooks were commended and relied
on by the New Mexico court in State v. Middleton, supra. His arguments set
out at further length in a dissent in the same case, I6 Tex. Ct. Rep. 223 (1905),
seem unanswerable.3 See Boston Sunday Herald, January 24, 1932, Section B, p. 4.
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Furthermore, the type of offender likely to benefit by holding that
if the arrest is illegal only personal hatred of the officer can make the
killing more than manslaughter, is dramatically revealed by the re-
cent Illinois cases. In People v. White,3 the defendant was apparently
in possession of a stolen car and was accompanied by a recently
escaped convict; while the defendants in People v. Scalisi,3, when
forced from their high-powered motor, waged a pitched battle using
the best approved gangster weapons. The failure of such holdings
to fit the punishment to either the offender or the offense could not be
more strikingly illustrated.
The related question of whether a third person who kills in resisting
the illegal arrest of another may set iap such illegality, is not properly
within the scope of this article, but the same principles should apply.
However, authority is split.
3
'
B 4. View That Hot Blood Aroused by an Illegal Arrest Will Not
Reduce a Killing from Murder to Manslaughter
A fundamental attack has been directed in several cases on the
desirability of recognizing the adequacy of the provocation of an
illegal arrest. An American court in the middle of the last century,3"
relying on the authority of an early English decision,39 affirmed a
murder conviction where the officer was killed while seeking to arrest
a defendant on an illegal warrant. The Georgia court said: -
"In Mackalley's case.. .it was resolved... that if there be error
in awarding process, or in mistake of one process for another, and
an officer be slain in the execution thereof, the offender shall not
have the advantage of such error; but that the resisting of the
officer, when he comes to make an arrest in the King's name, is
murder."
Other American courts using language in the opinions which exceeds
that of either the express malice or subjective standard cases, have
subsequently reached a like result.40 In the farthest reaching of these
35333 Ill. 512, 165 N. E. i68 (1929). 36324 Ill. 131, 154 N. E. 715 (1926).
37R. v. Tooley, supra, allowed it, but the case is said to be overruled in this
respect, see Warner's Case, i Mood. C. C. 380, 385 (1833). Also see Huggett's
Case, J. Kelyng 59 (I666) where it was held the provocation of unlawful arrest
could not avail third persons killing in attempting rescue. Contra: Alford v.
State, 8 Tex. App. 566 (i88o)-killing of officers unlawfully arresting brother,
manslaughter; subjective test applied. 3sBoyd v. State, 17 Ga. 194 (1855).
39Mackalley's Case, Co. 9 Report 61 (x61z).
40Alsop v. Comm., 4 Ky. Law Rep. 547 (1882). The court said, in a rare
opinion emphasizing the social interests involved: "known officer of law, armed
with a warrant, though defective.. .makes known his purpose, and in good faith
attempts to execute it, it is the duty of person about to be arrested to submit to his
authority, when exercised in a proper manner."
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cases, the illegal arrest was made by an officer not in uniform and
without any warrant giving "color of authority".4 ' If these cases are
confined to their particular facts, there is good reason for upholding
their results. On the other hand, it is doubtful whether they should
be followed as precedents for rejecting the factor of illegality of
arrest as a basis for a mitigating provocation to a killing. The great
majority of jurisdictions are definitely committed otherwise, and it
seems desirable to the writer that established bases for mitigation be
retained in order that there may be available a suitable means for
properly fitting the punishment to the crime and the individual. An
able judiciary, sensitive to the social interests concerned, will be able
with the aid of honest juries to apply the subjective test as to provo-
cation in order to prevent unworthy passions from becoming the
source of an indulgence to a vicious character. The manslaughter
sentence will remain available for a truly "accidental offender".
Whether the fact that the defendant was actually guilty of the
crime for which he was being illegally arrested should make a differ-
ence in the degree of homicide, is more properly treated under the
subject of arrests.4 2 Where such a circumstance makes an otherwise
illegal arrest legal, the homicide will of course be murder. But if the
illegality of the arrest is not affected, no authority has been found,
aside from the sweeping dictum in Brooks and Orme v. Comm.,43
which gives the fact of actual guilt of the resisting party any more
weight than that of strong evidence that the killing was the result of
other motives than hot blood aroused by illegality of arrest.
CONCLUSION
Homicide in resisting lawful arrest will be murder if the killing is
done with malice, which includes the accepted implied malice situ-
4
'People v. Bradley, 23 Cal. App. R. 44, 46, 136 Pac. 955, 956 (1913). Court
said: "The mere fact that the deceased failed to reveal his identity as a peace
officer, and the further fact that the arrest was apparently unauthorized and not
made in strict accord with the forms required by law, may have justified the de-
fendant in breaking the arrest, but such facts alone were wholly inadequate... to
reduce such killing from murder to manslaughter." See also People v. Gilman,
47 Cal. App. R. ii8, I9O Pac. 205 (1920).
42See J. B. Waite, Some Inadequacies in the Law of Arrest, 29 MIcH. L. REV. 448,
455 (193o-31 ). In advocating that actual guilt should be a factor in determining
lawfulness of arrest, he says: "This is a wholly rational proposition and con-
formable to the necessities both of social self-protection and the desiderata of in-
dividualism." See State v. Phillips, i8 Iowa 660, 92 N. W. 876 (19o2).-Dicta
to effect that "unlawful" arrest of the guilty party would be no wrong and there-
fore a basis for murder if resistance was fatal.
436i Pa. 352 (1869). Opinion points out the unlikelihood of a guilty party
killing from a passion caused by illegality of arrest.
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ations, but no case has been found where the decision had to rest on
malice implied from the mere resistance to arrest. The few decisions
in point indicate a refusal on the part of courts actually to apply the
oft-stated dictum that homicide in resisting a lawful arrest must be
murder. If the defendant can reasonably be charged with knowledge
of the character in which the arresting party acts, then probably
neither mistake of fact nor of law as to the legality of the arrest can
be the basis for an adequate provocation.
No statutory provisions altering the common law rule have been
found except those which might indirectly do so by making resistance
to arrest a felony."4 Most statutes, however, make resistance to
arrest a misdemeanor only.4
It is submitted that the time has come to cease perpetuating the
"rule" that malice will be implied from the mere resistance to lawful
arrest. Resistance to arrest was only a misdemeanor at common
law, and it has not generally been regarded more seriously by our
legislatures. The fortuitous circumstance that the officer should be
killed, where this result was neither intended nor likely to happen,
should not enhance the seriousness of the offense nor the-viciousness
of the offender. A manslaughter conviction will supply a full
measure of deterrence. The escaping "speedster" or other minor
automobile law offender is just one type of case likely to create two
equally unattractive alternatives: (I) to continue apologizing for a
UARuz. REv. CODE (1928) § 4516; 4 FLA. GEN. LAWS (Skillman, 1927) § 7524;
3 MICH. ComP. LAWS (1929) § 16585; 4 MO. STAT. ANN. (Permanent ed.) § 3897;
VT. GEN. LAWS (1917) § 7070. See also: KAN. REV. STAT. ANN. (1923) § 21-717;
ME. REV. STAT. (1930) § 2I ;2 N. H. PUB. LAWS (1926) c. 394 § 8. See People v.
Arnett, 239 Mich. 123, 125,214 N. W. 231, 232 (1927); State v. Green, 66 Mo. 631
(1877).
45ALA. CRIM. CODE (1923) § 5419; CAL. PEN. CODE (Deering, 1931) § 148; 2
COLO. ANN. STAT. (Mills, 1927) § 1856; 2 CONN. GEN. STAT. (193o) § 6183; 4 FLA.
GEN. LAWS (Skillman, 1927) § 7525; 6 GA. ANN. CODE (Park, 1914) § 311; 2
IDAHO Comp. STAT. (1919) § 8183; ILL. REV. STAT. (Cahill, 1931) § 513; IOwA
CODE (1931) § 13331; KAN. REV. STAT. ANN. (1923) §§ 21-718, 719; 2 MINN.
STAT. (Mason, 1927) § 9995; MISS. CODE (1930) § IO6I; 4 Mo. STAT. ANN. (Per-
manent Ed.) § 3898; 4 MONT. REV. CODES (Choate, 1921) § 10928; NEB. ComP.
STAT. (1929) § 28-729; 5 NEV. COmp. LAWS (1929) § I046; 2 N. H. PUB. LAWS
(1926) c. 394 § 5, 6, 7; N. M. STAT. ANN. COmP. (1929) § 35-2706; N. Y. CalM.
CODE AND PEN. LAW (Gilbert, I93O) §§ 6oo, 1787, 1825; 39 N. Y. CONS. LAWS
(McKinney) § 1851; N. C. CRaI. CODE (Jerome, 4th ed.) § 1002; 2 N. D. Comp.
LAWS ANN. (1913) §§ 93o6, 9398; OHIO GEN. CODE (Page, 1931) § 12858; PA.
STAT. (Purdon, Permanent Ed.) Title 34 § 1107, Title 75, § 743; 2 S. C. CODE OF
LAWS (1922) 104 (313) § 4; I S. D. Comp. LAWS (1929) § 3775; 3 TENN. CODE
(1932) § IIO44; 2 UTAH LAWS (1921) § 8002; W. VA. CODE (193I) 1481 § 61-5-17;
2 WASH. CODE (Pierce, 1919) § 9070; WIS. STAT. (1929) § 346.39; 4 U. S. S. A.
(1916) 192, Crim. Code § 140, 35 STAT. 1114, I8 U. S. C. A. (West, 1927) § 245.
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high percentage of our "lifers" as the best men in our penal insti-
tutions, or (2) to create another group of jury-made law cases. A
restatement of the law in harmony with all decisions is possible and is
desirable in the interests of more accurately fitting the penalty to
both the offense and the offender. Precisely stated, the rule is not
that a homicide in resisting lawful arrest will be murder, but rather
that a murder committed in resisting lawful arrest cannot be reduced
to manslaughter.
Whether a homicide growing out of a resistance to unlawful arrest
will be murder or manslaughter is dependent on whether an in-
dulgence is to be granted the offender. In the light of human ex-
perience it is not an unlikely fact that a known illegal arrest may
create hot blood. This is especially true if the arrest were illegal
because of improper tactics used in its execution, or if the arrested
party were innocent. Hence it seems neither feasible nor desirable
tq alter the common law recognition of an adequate provocation in
this situation. So reduced, the problem is one of whether a de-
fendant has established his provocation by showing that the arrest
was in fact illegal or whether he must go further and prove that he
killed out of hot blood aroused by the illegality of the arrest.
The circumstances under which the law can afford to recognize
provocation are succinctly stated in Ex parte Sherwood: 6
"The attempt must be to make an unlawful arrest; the pris-
oner must know of the attempt, and he must know that the
attempt is to make an unlawful arrest. Why? Because with-
out such knowledge the provocation could have no effect upon
him whatever, and hence without such knowledge it is abso-
lutely certain that his passions, if any, were not caused by this
provocation."
It should not be an undue hardship on a defendant to require him to
prove that he killed from severe provocation. The law requires this
much of him in other situations where he seeks the protection of a
provocation or justification claim. Certainly, it should be no more
bountiful in a situation where the highest public interest is involved.
If a defendant cannot affirmatively establish this mitigating cir-
cumstance, "the inference is irresistible that it was an arrest which he
feared and which he resisted-the more legal it was, the more he
feared it."47
4629 Tex. App. 334,335 (189o). Such a statement of the subjective standard is
ordinarily sufficient. However, further difficulties may be imagined in deciding.
what subjective knowledge is to be required; for example, is it sufficient that the
defendant erroneously thought the arrest was illegal for one reason where it was in
fact illegal for another? Logically it would be murder, but quare?
47Willia=s v. Comm., supra note 30, 722.
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The Canadian Criminal Code § 261 (4) states the rule in its most
satisfactory form. s
"The illegality of an arrest does not necessarily reduce an
offense of culpable homicide from murder to manslaughter, but
if the illegality was known to the offender it may be evidence of
provocation."
A restatement of the law in the United States might well adopt such a
provision as a model.49 Thus indulgence will be denied to one who
acts not from a weakness common to human beings, but rather from
the strength of anti-social attitudes.
In short, the difference between the majority rule and that of the
Canadian Criminal Code is this: by the latter, the defendant recog-
nizes his provocation; while by the former, it is ex post facto dis-
covered for him by counsel's research.
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49Cases arising under the following Mississippi statute apply the objective
standard. Miss. CODE (Hemingway, 1927) § IOI6, (1930) § 995: "Every person
who shall unnecessarily kill another, either while resisting an attempt by such
other person to commit any felony, or to do any unlawful act, or after such at-
tempt shall have failed, shall be guilty of manslaughter." See Williams v. State,
122 Miss. 15i, 84 So. 8 (I919); Bergman v. State, 133 So. 2o8 (1931).
